



Palestinian History and Politics

An Introduction and Documentary Reader



Edited by **Gregory S. Mahler**
and **Mahdi F. Abdul Hadi**

ROUTLEDGE

Palestinian History and Politics

This textbook brings together a collection of the most important primary sources in the study of Palestinian nationalism, from the late 19th century through to the present day.

Drawing from the eight-volume, 3,500-page collection published by the Palestinian Academic Society for the Study of International Affairs, this volume contains over 170 of the most important documents in Palestinian political history. Each document has been carefully edited so that extraneous material is removed, making it easier for the student to understand the historical threads that connect the documents. The collection here includes private memoranda and correspondence, political speeches, official treaties, formal letters of understanding, multinational agreements, and international communiqués, and will provide the student with an excellent foundation to understand why Palestinian nationalism has not been as successful in the region as other nationalist movements. In addition, an introductory chapter provides key context for the study of Palestinian history, illustrating the history of successes and challenges faced by proponents of Palestinian nationalism.

Palestinian History and Politics: An Introduction and Documentary Reader is a single volume that will interest students focused on Palestine's quest for national status, as well as instructors teaching courses on Palestinian political history.

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Edited by
Gregory S. Mahler and
Mahdi F. Abdul Hadi

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In Memory of Mahdi F. Abdul Hadi, 1944–2025



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Preface

The collection of documents included here is based upon a massive multi-volume collection of documents published in 2007, assembled and edited by Dr. Mahdi F. Abdul Hadi of the Palestinian Academic Society for the Study of International Affairs (PASSIA) in Jerusalem titled *Documents on Palestine* (hereafter *Documents*). The *Documents* series is a collection of 1,566 documents dating from prior to 1900 through 2007 that make up an eight-volume collection of over 3,500 pages! That work is, as these numbers suggest, both massive and comprehensive, and provides scholars with an opportunity to have access to significant documents created between 1900 and 2007 that are important in the study of the quest of the Palestinians for a sovereign state. A small number of documents appearing since 2007 are also included in this volume in addition to the selections from the *Documents* series; they make up only a fraction of the total included here.

The problem for students seeking to study Palestinian nationalism is that eight volumes, and over 3,500 pages, require a substantial commitment from anyone wanting to understand the Palestinian struggle for nationhood. Every academic term in higher education around the world there are hundreds of courses taught on “Palestinian nationalism,” “Palestinian history,” “Palestine in the Middle East,” “Palestine and Israel,” or “the Palestinian-Israeli Conflict,” and access to the *Documents* series would be very helpful for the instructors of these courses. These courses cannot, however, require students to purchase an eight-volume collection of documents, and most academic libraries today have restricted acquisition budgets and space that limit the number of volumes that they can purchase. What is needed is a *condensed* offering to make the *most important* of these documents available to libraries, instructors, and students.

This volume attempts to respond to that need.

This volume offers a collection of documents from a variety of sources, including (in no special order) bi- and multinational treaties, League of Nations and United Nations resolutions, various governmental policy statements, non-governmental organization position papers, political speeches, and personal correspondence, among others. Governmental documents from Palestine, Israel, Britain, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Jordan, Norway, the United

States, and other countries are included here, as are multinational documents from the Arab League, the European Union, the G-8, the Gulf-Cooperation Council, the “Quartet,” the League of Nations, and the United Nations. The documents were selected for their relevance to the key question asked here: Why has Palestine not been successful in establishing a sovereign national government when all of its neighbors have been able to do so?

The reader will find here over 170 documents organized chronologically, beginning with Theodore Herzl’s *The Jewish State* (published in 1896) and ending with the International Court of Justice’s legal decision titled “Legal Consequences Arising from the Policies and Practices of Israel in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Including East Jerusalem” (published in 2024). These 170+ documents are documents which students of Palestinian political history should meet.

It is almost inevitable, of course, that there will be disagreement about *which* documents should make up any limited collection that is intended to serve as “the core” of a field of inquiry, and the study of Palestinian political history is no exception to this. The *Documents* collection upon which this volume is based, as noted, was an eight-volume, 3,500-page collection of 1,566 documents through 2007. The goal of *those* eight volumes was comprehensiveness. *This* volume, on the other hand, includes only about 170 of those 1,566 documents (with the inclusion of some additional documents that appeared after the final PASSIA volumes went to press), and has as a goal not comprehensiveness but rather an *introduction* to the literature. Almost 1,400 of the 1,566 documents from the *Documents* collection are *not* included here, but the tradeoff offered by this volume is one of focus for breadth. It is our view that the documents included here present the core of the story of the quest for Palestinian nationalism, they shine lights on key moments in the Palestinian quest for nationhood, and will serve as an effective point of departure for a study of Palestinian political history.

The documents included here have, for the most part, been edited for length and clarity. It is important to note, however, that at the end of this volume we have provided online references to *full* unedited texts of *all* of the documents included here, so that any reader who wants to do so can examine an unedited copy of any document included here. All of the documents dated 2007 or earlier can be found on the PASSIA website, as noted further along. We have also provided non-PASSIA online references for virtually all of the documents – almost 90% of documents – as well as all documents dated since 2007.

Goals

In order to study the challenges faced by Palestinians in the quest for national sovereignty, three things are needed. *First*, one must understand and appreciate the broad historical background and foreign policy context within which

the Palestinians have operated. *Second*, one must describe and clarify the specific historical relationship between the Palestinians and Israel, and the conflict between the Palestinians and Zionism as an ideology as Israel was coming into existence, as well as specific claims pertaining to territory and borders. *Third*, one must understand the environment dealing with the more contemporary peace process itself, and the historical record dealing with the peace process that has evolved over the last 70+ years.

The first point is very important. Although the study of relevant history is important for understanding the political environment in *any* political context, it is *especially* important in the case of Palestine and its neighbors. Attention must be devoted to background, to understanding general claims to the territory involved, decisions taken during the British Mandate period and the British departure, and the subsequent conflict of the British withdrawal and the period of United Nations-sponsored partition and resulting conflict. This, in turn, involves an awareness of and familiarity with original documents relevant to that period.

The second point is equally necessary. We need to study the more specific historical relationship between the Palestinians and Israel, and the Zionist movement, as well as specific claims pertaining to territory and borders. This involves an understanding of how Zionists successfully brought Israel into existence, despite the fact that the land called Palestine already had occupants at the time that Zionists first appeared there. Thus, some awareness of Zionism and its successes is necessary in our work here. As well, students need to understand who the Palestinians were/are, and their history and role in the Middle East. Their goals and aspirations, and their interactions with the goals of Zionism and the new State of Israel are germane here. This, too, involves an awareness of and familiarity with original documents.

The third point brings the historical perspective up to date. Students need to understand the environment dealing with more modern history and the on-again-off-again peace process that has evolved in the last 70+ years. While the early years of the Israel-Palestine conflict did not generate a successful peace initiative, the period since 1978 has seen numerous initiatives, some more successful than others, most recently the *Abraham Accords* (2020) initiative of US President Donald Trump that substantially ignored the Palestinians. Each of these initiatives needs to be examined to understand what worked, and what didn't. Again, this also involves an awareness of and familiarity with original documents.

For students who are capable of doing so, exposure to primary documents rather than reading someone else's interpretation of those documents can be a voyage of discovery and can deeply enrich the learning process. It is our hope that this volume will make a real contribution to the process of discovery for students worldwide. The study of the issues involved in Palestinian political history is so dependent upon primary documentation that students should have the opportunity to read the letters, treaties, United Nations Resolutions, speeches, and other documents for themselves.

Sources

As noted earlier, in the *References* section of this volume we have provided online references to all documents included here. *All* of the 3,500 pages of the eight-volume collection of 1,566 documents through 2007 – including all of the documents reprinted here selected from those 1,566 documents dated through 2007 – are available in the printed version of the *Documents on Palestine* collection. The full reference to that printed collection is:

Mahdi Abdul Hadi, ed. *Documents on Palestine* (8 vols). Jerusalem: Palestinian Academic Society for the Study of International Affairs, 2007.

All of the 3,500 pages of the eight-volume collection of 1,566 documents through 2007 – including all of the documents reprinted here selected from those 1,566 documents dated through 2007 – are available online at the website of the Palestinian Academic Society for the Study of International Affairs, in addition to the individual scholarly or governmental websites that we have listed in the *References* section. The website for the eight-volume *Documents* collection is:

<http://passia.org/publications/302>

Using this link will take the reader to the PASSIA website where all PASSIA publications are available. Also, all the documents included here dated post-2007 are available online from academic or governmental sources, as indicated in the *References* section of this volume.

A Note on the Editing

We noted earlier that almost all the documents included here have been edited for length and clarity. Publishing parameters have placed limits on the overall length of this volume, so a choice has had to be made about the tradeoff between the *number of documents* that could be included here and the total *number of pages* that the volume could include. A compromise seemed to be to include *more* documents, but to edit them so that material not really relevant to this volume was not included. Many of the documents included here contained material – sometimes as little as a sentence or two, sometimes several paragraphs or pages at a time – that, while important when the documents were being negotiated, is of far less significance to the study of Palestinian political history from today's perspective, and that material was deleted. Four examples will illustrate the kind of editing that was done.

1. A TREATY

The League of Nations negotiated a *Mandate for Palestine* in 1922, giving Britain wide-ranging powers in administering the territories that would

become Israel and Palestine. In Article 24 of the League of Nations Mandate (dated 24 July 1922), the text reads as follows:

The Mandatory shall make to the Council of the League of Nations an annual report to the satisfaction of the Council as to the measures taken during the year to carry out the provisions of the mandate. Copies of all laws and regulations promulgated or issued during the year shall be communicated with the report.

In order to save space, that was edited in this volume to read as follows:

The Mandatory shall make to the Council of the League of Nations an annual report to the satisfaction of the Council as to the measures taken during the year to carry out the provisions of the mandate.

2. A BINATIONAL AGREEMENT

In the “Israeli-Palestinian Agreement on Movement and Access” dated 15 November 2005, the parties involved were concerned about the operation of the Rafah crossing at the southern end of the Gaza Strip, and the ability to have open (or nearly-open) crossing for agricultural products at that border point. The parties actively negotiated that agreement, including (point 2 bullet 2) that

The new and additional scanner will be installed and fully operational by December 31. At that time, the number of export trucks per day to be processed through Karni will reach 150, and 400 by end-2006. A common management system will be adopted by both parties.

This was edited in this volume to read as follows:

The new and additional scanner will be installed and fully operational by December 31. At that time, the number of export trucks per day to be processed through Karni will reach 150, and 400 by end-2006.

3. A POLITICAL POSITION PAPER

In May of 2006, the “NATIONAL CONCILIATION DOCUMENT OF THE PALESTINIAN PRISONERS” was adopted by Palestinian prisoners in Israeli jails, including Hamas and Fatah members, as a basis for national consensus. Point 4 of that document said

4. To set up a Palestinian plan towards comprehensive political action and to unify the Palestinian political rhetoric on the basis of the Palestinian national consensus program and Arab legitimacy and the international

legitimacy resolutions that grant justice to the Palestinian people who are represented by the PLO and the PNA as president and government, and the national and Islamic factions and the civil society organizations and the public figures in order to mobilize Arab, Islamic and international political and financial and economic and humanitarian support and solidarity to our people and to our PNA and to support the right of our people in self determination and freedom and return and independence and to confront the plan of Israel in imposing the Israeli solution on our people and to confront the oppressive siege on the Palestinian people.

This was edited in this volume to read as follows:

4. To set up a Palestinian plan towards comprehensive political action and to unify the Palestinian political rhetoric on the basis of the Palestinian national consensus program and Arab legitimacy.

4. A POLITICAL SPEECH

On 17 March 2007, Prime Minister-elect Ismail Haniyeh delivered a speech before the Palestinian Legislative Council, describing his intended “Program of Palestinian Unity Government.” In that speech he outlined what he intended to be the program of his “national unity government.” At the beginning of the speech he offered welcoming comments, including:

I welcome all of you on this great day and I welcome Mr. Alvaro de Sotro, the Representative of the UN Secretary General in the Middle East region and the accompanying delegation. I was hoping that the PLC would convene with all members present and that it would be headed by our brother Dr. Aziz al-Dweik, the PLC Speaker, and that it would be held in Jerusalem, but the occupation prevented this from happening and insists on keeping the PLC members and ministers under detention and the occupation continues in its policies to isolate and disconnect the parts of the homeland and to Judaize Jerusalem and isolate it from its surroundings, along with the continuation of the incursions and the incursion in Nablus by the occupation on the eve of announcing the government came to escalate the oppression against our people. The arrest of the Speaker of the PLC and his brothers, the members of the PLC and the ministers and the heads of local councils, is clear proof on the cruelty and oppression of the occupation and evidence on the collective punishment and oppressive siege against our people and their government and their PLC in the past year because of the democratic option that we adopted in our political life and because of our commitment to the Palestinian rights and constants and because we rejected making any concessions under the austerity of the siege and aggression.

This was edited in this volume to read as follows:

I welcome all of you on this great day . . . I was hoping that the PLC would convene with all members present and that it would be headed by our brother Dr. Aziz al-Dweik, the PLC Speaker, and that it would be held in Jerusalem, but the occupation prevented this . . . The arrest of the Speaker of the PLC and his brothers, the members of the PLC and the ministers and the heads of local councils, is clear proof of the cruelty and oppression of the occupation and evidence on the collective punishment and oppressive siege against our people and their government.

While the original level of detail was important in the negotiations of the treaties and binational agreements and political position papers and political speeches at the time, from the current historical perspective the elided material is less important, especially if editing the documents permits us to include additional documents in our collection.

This volume also contains a large number of political speeches made by historically significant actors, each interested in putting his personal views forward in his own way, including speeches by Arab leaders Amir Faisal of the Arab Kingdom of Hedjaz, Prince Fahd of Saudi Arabia, and King Hussein of Jordan; Winston Churchill and Prime Minister Ramsay MacDonald of Britain; Palestinian leaders Yasser Arafat, Mahmoud Abbas, Ismail Haniyeh, Sa'eb Erekat, and Faisal Husseini; Israeli leaders Levi Eshkol, Menachem Begin, Ariel Sharon, Ehud Olmert, and Benjamin Netanyahu; American presidents Ronald Reagan, George H. W. Bush, Bill Clinton, and Donald Trump. The individual styles of these leaders varied, of course, and the texts of the speeches were edited to delete material less relevant to our purposes here. Again, *all* of these documents are available unedited online at the website of the *Palestinian Academic Society for the Study of International Affairs*, in addition to the individual scholarly or governmental websites that we have listed in the *References* section.

What Is Included Here and What Is Not

Our goal in this volume is to provide a credible representation of the materials that have been found in the political literature related to Palestinian political history. Clearly, however, our goal of producing a single volume that would be useful to students and scholars has meant that we have not been able to include *everything* that we might want to include in this volume.

We have tried to include what we felt were the most significant treaties and formal agreements here, but as noted earlier, publishing parameters have forced us to limit what was included. The *Documents* series included over 1,500 documents; obviously, this volume's 170 documents left out most of those documents. However, our volume including a *selection* of documents will enable students to *begin* their study of Palestinian political history with key documents in front of them.

The United Nations has produced dozens and dozens (and dozens) of resolutions on Palestine over the years, from both the General Assembly and the Security Council as well as special committees and task forces; only a very few of those are included here. The European Union High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy has regularly made observations about events in the Middle East conflict. They are mostly not included here. The US Congress regularly has passed resolutions sharing its views on the conflict in the Middle East; those resolutions are mostly not included here. Statements by the British Foreign Office over the years are also mostly not included. The same can be said of pronouncements of “The Quartet,” the European Union Council, the United States White House and individual US Presidents, and the US Congress, not to mention the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Israel, various spokesmen for the Palestine Authority, individual speeches by the Presidents of Egypt, the King of Saudi Arabia, the King of Jordan, and on and on.

The Production of This Volume

As we noted at the outset of this section, this volume offers the student undertaking a study of Palestinian political history a collection of documents that illustrate the range of challenges – both victories and non-victories – faced by Palestinian political leaders over the last hundred or so years. The focus of this volume is to trace Palestine’s quest for sovereignty, for nation-state status, and to try to understand what factors can explain why Palestine has not achieved international recognition as a sovereign state while its neighbors in the Middle East have managed to do so. It allows the student to hear the words of the political actors who were facing the challenges of their times, and permits a better understanding of the forces of the day than might otherwise be offered.

We want to thank colleagues at Taylor & Francis Books for their support of this project. We also want to thank the Routledge editorial and production staff, including Balaji Karuppanan at Apex CoVantage, for their careful work in bringing this volume to life. As well, we owe a debt of gratitude to Deniz Altayli, Program Director at PASSIA, for her assistance in finding original sources and providing important information as this project moved forward.



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Introduction

Gregory S. Mahler and Alden Mahler Levine

Palestinian History and Politics

Palestinian nationalism has been a subject of academic study since well before the British partition of Palestine in 1922. From that time to the present, literally thousands of academic papers and monographs have been published dealing with the topic. Books have been written on the history of the Palestinians, on their quest for a sovereign state, on their economic progress, and on their social and cultural makeup. And, of course, huge numbers of articles and books have been written on the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, on early proposals for partition of Palestine into a Jewish state and an Arab state, on Palestinian resistance and survival under Israeli occupation, and on the continued quest for Palestinian independence, to list only some of the subjects of scholarship in the area.

There is no shortage of secondary analysis of the Palestinian past, the Palestinian present, or ideas about the Palestinian future. All of this scholarship, to varying degrees, is based upon a significant body of *documents* that make up a foundation for the study of Palestine's history. Unlike some contemporary nationalist movements, the Palestinians have over the years done an outstanding job of leaving a "paper trail" of their work toward sovereignty and independence. Their challenges have been recorded, their initiatives have been documented, and their conflicts have been chronicled, and the body of this documentation is quite substantial.

Palestinian nationalism was but one of many different national movements that existed in the political world at the end of the First World War, many of which were to be found in the Middle East. Of those movements, several succeeded in becoming sovereign states by the time that the United Nations came into being at the end of the Second World War, but not Palestine. Many of those national movements, and other new arrivals outside of the Middle East, sought sovereign status in the years following the Second World War, but not Palestine. There were 51 founding members of the United Nations in 1945; by 2023 it had 193 members, but not Palestine.

The question is: Why not? We can work our way through a long list of nation-states in the Middle East today, and virtually all of them have achieved

See Document 1.
Theodore Herzl,
The Jewish State,
1896

See Document 2.
The Basle Program,
First Zionist
Congress, Basle, 31
August 1897.

See Document 3.
Letter of Yousef
Duya-Uddin
(Pasha) Al-Khalidi,
Mayor of Jerusalem,
to the Chief Rabbi
of France, Zadok
Kahn, 1899 and
Theodore Herzl's
Response, 1899.

See Document 4.
MacMahon-Hussein
Correspondence,
1915–1916.

See Document 5.
British Govern-
ment, Message to
King Hussein of the
Arab Kingdom of
Hedjaz Regarding
Palestinian Holy
Places and Zionist
Colonisation,
January, 1916.

See Document 6.
The Sykes-Picot
Agreement, 16 May
1916.

See Document 7.
Successive Drafts
and Final Text
of the Balfour
Declaration, July–
November, 1917.

sovereign status since the end of the First World War, but Palestine has not, despite having credible arguments for attaining that status. The focus of this volume is to trace Palestine's quest for sovereignty, for nation-state status, and to try to understand what factors can explain why Palestine has not achieved international recognition as a sovereign state.

THE OTTOMAN PERIOD

The leaders of the early Palestinian national movement were leaders in the Arab awakening and challenge to Ottoman rule. They established and led various organizations in the joint Arab effort to revive their language and culture, and to express their aspirations for independence within a wider Arab cause. These Arab and Palestinian leaders were very aware of the threat that was posed by the colonial powers and the Zionist movement. They also wanted a state of their own.

During the First World War the Western Allies pinpointed the weakness of the Turkish Ottoman Empire – an ally of Germany – which was partially caused by the unrest of the Arab people calling for autonomy and independence. In 1915, the British government commissioned Sir Henry MacMahon to correspond with the Hashemite leader Sharif Hussein Ibn Ali of Mecca to encourage him to rise against the Ottomans. In return, MacMahon offered British support for a unified Arab kingdom under Hashemite leadership. This assurance contributed to the outbreak of the Arab revolt of June 1916.

In the same year, 1916, the French and British reached a secret agreement (the Sykes-Picot agreement) dividing the Ottoman Empire under their control after the war. Britain would acquire Iraq and Jordan, while France would receive Syria (including Lebanon). Palestine was to be divided with France controlling the North and Britain the Haifa-Akko area, the rest (excluding the Negev) to be placed under international administration.

At the same time, the British held talks with Zionist leaders and promised the Zionists their support for a Jewish “homeland” in Palestine. Formalized in the Balfour Declaration (November 1917), the British also promised to protect the rights of non-Jewish inhabitants of Palestine.

See Document 8.
Agreement
between Amir
Faisal of the Arab
Kingdom of Hedjaz
and Chaim Weiz-
mann of the Zion-
ist Organization, 3
January 1919.

See Document 9.
Statement by
Anti-Zionist Jews
to the Paris Peace
Conference, 4
March 1919.

See Document 10.
The British White
Paper ("Churchill
White Paper"):
British Policy in
Palestine, 3 June
1922.

See Document 11.
Council of the
League of Nations,
Confirmed Text on
the Terms of the
British Mandate, 24
July 1922.

See Document 12.
Chairman of the
Palestine Zionist
Executive Colonel
Frederick H. Kisch,
Note of a Conver-
sation with Musa
Kazim Al-Husseini,
Jerusalem, 23
October 1923.

See Document 13.
Arab Draft of
Points on Palestine,
Presented to John
Philby, Damascus,
21 October 1929.

ALLIED OCCUPATION

The First World War continued and Amir Faisal, son of Sharif Hussein Ibn Ali, led the Arab revolt forces alongside Allied troops into Damascus in October 1917, and within two months, the British Army entered Jerusalem under General Allenby, ending 400 years of Ottoman rule. The British then established the Occupied Enemy Territory Administration (OETA) which controlled the area from 1918–1920.

The three British pledges (the 1915 MacMahon-Hussein Correspondence; the 1916 Sykes-Picot Agreement; and the 1917 Balfour Declaration) were in fact internally contradictory, and with historical hindsight we can say that they set the stage for future conflict in the region. At the time, however, the British encouraged their allies – the Arab national movement under Amir Faisal, and the Zionist movement under Chaim Weizmann – to try to formulate an early agreement on Arab-Jewish relations in Palestine. Faisal knew no English and Weizmann no Arabic, so the British intermediaries (T. E. Lawrence) drafted the documents according to their interpretation of what was agreed. Faisal added his own handwritten conditions in Arabic to the English document.

Following the First World War, the League of Nations considered the future of Palestine, and both Zionist forces and Anti-Zionist forces made contributions to the League's deliberations. In 1920, the League gave Britain a mandate to control Palestine, and Sir Herbert Samuel was appointed High Commissioner. In that year Amir Faisal was proclaimed King of Syria and Chaim Weizmann was elected president of the Zionist Organization.

From 1921 the Arabs in Palestine began to increase their resistance to the British Mandate and to Jewish immigration, and the British invited Arab delegations to London to meet with Weizmann to try to resolve disagreements. This and later meetings were unable to deliver what the British hoped for. In 1922, the British government published the Churchill White Paper, which redefined the British interpretation of its responsibilities to the Mandate and the idea of the Jewish "homeland" in Palestine, and Transjordan was separated from the area eligible for "homeland" pledges made by Balfour.

See Document 14.
Statement of Policy
by His Majesty's
Government,
Presented by the
Secretary of State
for the Colonies
to Parliament by
Command of his
Majesty –
The "Passfield
White Paper," 1
October 1930.

See Document 15.
British Prime
Minister Ramsay
MacDonald, Letter
to Chaim Weiz-
mann, President of
the World Zionist
Organization,
("Black Letter"), 13
February 1931.

See Document 16.
Ahmad Salih
Al-Khalidi, Principal
of the Government
Arab College,
Proposal for
Cantonization and
Formation of an
Arab and Jewish
State, July 1934.

See Document 17.
Fatwa from the
Religious Schol-
ars of Palestine
Regarding Selling of
the Lands to Jews,
26 January 1935.

See Document 18.
Summary Report of
the Palestine Royal
Commission ("Peel
Commission"),
Presented by the
Secretary of State

THE BRITISH MANDATE PERIOD AND UN PARTITION RESOLUTION

The Mandate document gave Britain control of Palestine and provided for a Jewish homeland therein, and stressed the protection of the rights of the non-Jewish native population. Uprisings throughout the 1920s, culminating in the 1929 Arab Revolt in Palestine, led to a reexamination of the immigration policy for Palestine. In 1930, a new document (the Passfield White Paper) drew the conclusions together and recommended that Jewish immigration be limited, as it threatened Arab well-being and economic development. The Zionists reacted critically, and Prime Minister Ramsay MacDonald wrote to Weizmann, largely nullifying the immigration clauses in the Passfield White Paper.

Tensions in Palestine increased, with the native non-Jewish population increasingly unhappy with the growth of the Zionist presence. While some Palestinian leaders contemplated various solutions to the problem, others sought to limit the Jewish presence in Palestine.

The Palestinian Great Revolt began in 1936. Another British commission was appointed to investigate the situation. In its report in 1937, it recognized the contradictory commitments that had been made by Britain, and concluded that Jews and Arabs could not live in peace. Its conclusion was to suggest partition into two states as the solution. Partition was largely rejected by the Arabs and met a divided reaction from the Zionists. The British accepted partition in principle and set up the Woodhead Commission to investigate its practicability. The revolt resurfaced in 1938 and at the end of that year the Woodhead Report concluded that partition was *not* practicable. This was followed by various proposals and discussions, but none led to a solution.

At a conference at St James's Palace in London – the 1939 Round Table Conference – the outcome was an impasse among the delegations. The Zionist delegation called for increased immigration quotas and more settlements in Palestine, while the Arab delegation demanded rejection of the Balfour Declaration and an end to Zionist immigration to Palestine. Colonial Secretary MacDonald's White Paper of that year outlined the creation of a single Palestinian state and a five-year immigration policy for Jewish immigrants. At the end of the five-year period a

for the Colonies to the United Kingdom Parliament, 7 July 1937.

See Document 19. Palestine Partition Commission ("Woodhead Commission") – British Policy Statement against Partition, November 1938.

See Document 20. The British White Paper ("MacDonald White Paper"), 17 May 1939.

See Document 21. The Arab Case for Palestine: Evidence Submitted by the Arab Office, Jerusalem, to the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry, March 1946.

See Document 22. Arab Higher Committee Member Jamal Bey Husseini, Statement Before the Ad Hoc Committee on the Palestine Question on Arab Reactions to the UNSCOP Proposals, 29 September 1947.

See Document 23. United Nations General Assembly: Resolution 181, The Partition of Palestine, 29 November 1947.

new immigration policy would be up to the local government. This was rejected by the Zionist movement, but it remained British policy until 1947.

The publication of the MacDonald White Paper was seen by the British government as a reasonable option to pursue in the context of British policy prior to the outbreak of the Second World War. The British were worried about offending the Arab Middle East – not wanting Arab governments to side with Germany – and they were *not* worried about the possibility that the Zionists would start to support the Germans. The White Paper remained British policy until 1947 when the British announced their intention to leave Palestine, and the British handed over the Palestine question to the United Nations.

International Zionist organizations were not sitting by passively, however. In the United States, the "Biltmore Conference" took place at New York City's Biltmore Hotel in early May 1942, with Zionist leaders from many different nations and over 500 delegates in attendance. The Conference was a response to the British White Paper of 1939, and in a sense took international Zionist activism to a new level in terms of its support for the creation of a Jewish State in Palestine, something that major Zionist organizations were not prepared to do prior to the White Paper. At the Conference a call was made for the "gates of Palestine to be opened for a Jewish Commonwealth." However, this did not result in a change in British policy.

The Second World War changed the context of the Middle East question, of course. The question of where to settle Jewish refugees took on a momentum of its own. After the war, a joint Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry was formed to investigate how the tensions in Palestine could be resolved. The Arab response to Zionist actions was negative, and the Arab position continued to be that no Jewish State could be created in Palestine. In March 1946, the document "The Arab Case for Palestine" was released, and it suggested that the Arab powers were prepared to accept a modest Zionist *presence* in Palestine, but that presence would have to "satisfy certain conditions," and would have to have as its goal that "over time the exclusiveness of the Jews will be neutralized by the development of loyalty to the [Palestinian] state." This was not a satisfactory outcome for the Zionists, either the activists in Palestine or those in other areas of the world. The British government rejected this proposal, leading

See Document 24.
US President Harry S. Truman, Proposal for a Temporary UN Trusteeship for Palestine, 25 March 1948.

See Document 25.
Provisional State Council, Proclamation of Israeli Independence, Tel Aviv, 14 May 1948.

See Document 26.
Arab League States, Statement Following the Establishment of the State of Israel, 15 May 1948.

See Document 27.
UN Mediator on Palestine Count Folke Bernadotte, Suggestions Presented to the Two Parties, 27 June 1948.

See Document 28.
Cablegram from the Premier and Acting Foreign Secretary of the All-Palestine Government, Ahmed Hilmi Pasha, to the UN Secretary-General Concerning the Constitution of the All-Palestine Government, 28 September 1948.

See Document 29.
Palestine Arab Higher Committee,

to a search for a solution on the basis of federalization or cantonization.

The Anglo-American Committee ended up concluding that European nations needed to do more to meet the needs of the Jewish victims of the Nazis, that 100,000 certificates should be issued right away for immigration into Palestine for Jews who had been the victims of Nazi and Fascist persecution, that Palestine should be declared neither a Jewish nor an Arab state, that the United Nations should extend the Mandate for Palestine, and that attention should be paid to both Arab and Jewish education in Palestine, among other policies.

It is probably unnecessary to explain why the Second World War was a defining historical moment for the Jews of the world. In the Holocaust, Jews faced the ultimate expression of the anti-Semitism they had known for so long. After the Holocaust, anti-Semitism was indisputably real, both to Jews and to the rest of the world. Moreover, after the Holocaust, many world leaders sympathized with the decimated Jewish population. Suddenly, a Jewish homeland seemed less like a dramatic overreaction and much more likely to happen.

In the light of the new global attitudes on the subject, and because few other options were available to them, survivors of the Holocaust and other disaffected Jews flooded into the British holdings in Palestine. The Zionists in Palestine increased their military campaign against British rule, justifying their call for a state on the basis of the promises made by European leaders, especially following the Holocaust. In 1947, following the bombing of Jerusalem's King David Hotel and the hanging of two British sergeants by the Jewish Irgun terrorist organization, the British turned the Palestinian question over to the new United Nations.

In April 1947, the UN established a Special Committee on Palestine (UNSCOP) which presented majority and minority reports of recommendations. In November 1947, the General Assembly passed Resolution 181 which followed the recommendations of the majority report, calling for the partition of Palestine into an Arab state and a Jewish state, with an international enclave encompassing Jerusalem and Bethlehem. That proposal was unequivocally rejected by the Palestinian Arabs and representatives of other Arab states.

Palestinian Proclamation of Independence, Gaza, 1 October 1948.

See Document 30. National Council Conference, Palestine Arab Higher Committee, Palestinian Proclamation of Independence, Gaza, 1 October 1948.

See Document 31. UN Conciliation Commission for Palestine, Working Paper on the Future of Arab Palestine and the Question of Partition Prepared by the Secretariat, 30 July 1949.

See Document 32. UN General Assembly, Resolution 303 on Jerusalem, 9 December 1949.

See Document 33. Jordanian House of Deputies and House of Notables, Joint Resolution Annexing the West Bank and Jerusalem, Amman, 24 April 1950.

See Document 34. National Covenant of the Palestine Liberation Organization, First Arab Palestine Congress, Jerusalem, 28 May 1964.

See Document 35. Israeli Prime

JORDANIAN/EGYPTIAN RULE IN THE WEST BANK AND GAZA STRIP

The Palestinians in the area administered by the British under the Mandate comprised about two-thirds of the population of the territory and rejected the Partition Resolution (Resolution 181) of the United Nations. The Jewish Agency, representing the Jewish population in the administered area, accepted the Resolution as a first step towards the formation of a Jewish state. On 14 May 1948, the Zionist leaders of Palestine formed a provisional government and proclaimed the State of Israel.

The Arab Higher Committee called on Arab states to save Palestine, and the subsequent war led to the Palestinian *Nakba*. The Arabs responded immediately – within hours. A force comprised of Syrian, Egyptian, and Jordanian troops (and backed by those countries and Iraq, Lebanon, and Saudi Arabia as well) entered Palestine. It was nearly a year before the two sides reached an armistice, in April 1949. The armistice reflected the *status quo* positions of each party, and because of its military successes Israel was awarded significantly more territory than it had been given under the United Nations' earlier partition plan. Israeli forces took some of the territory that had been intended for the Arab Palestinian State, while Jordan took control of the West Bank, and Egypt gained control of the Gaza Strip. The Palestinians found themselves divided, and nowhere independent: an Arab minority within the Israeli State; citizens of Jordan on the West Bank; residents of Gaza under Egyptian administration; and stateless refugees in the neighboring Arab countries. However, on 1st October 1948, the Higher Arab Committee declared Palestine to be independent and established an All-Palestine Government in Gaza.

The serious refugee problem caused by the *Nakba* led the United Nations to form the United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) for Palestinian refugees in the Near East. Temporary camps were set up for the refugees, and their right to return to their homes or receive compensation was included in UN Resolution 194.

The 1948 Arab-Israeli War ended in various truces signed in the early 1950s. In the following years the Palestine Question was primarily addressed as a refugee problem; however, it affected surrounding countries in the form of coups d'état in Syria, assassinations (Lebanese Prime

Minister Levi Eshkol, Statement to the Knesset – “The Israeli Peace Plan,” Jerusalem, 17 May 1965.

See Document 36. League of Arab States, Council of Foreign Ministers, Protocol for the Treatment of Palestinians in Arab States (“Casablanca Protocol”), 11 September 1965.

See Document 37. League of Arab States, Summit Conference Resolution, Khartoum, 1 September 1967.

See Document 38. UN Security Council, Resolution 242, 22 November 1967.

See Document 39. Palestine Liberation Organization, Statement Rejecting UN Security Council Resolution 242, Cairo, 23 November 1967.

See Document 40. The Palestinian National Charter: Resolutions of the Palestine National Council (PNC), Cairo, 17 July 1968.

See Document 41. Palestine National Liberation Movement (Fateh), Seven

Minister Riad Al-Suhl and King Abdullah in Jordan); and the Egyptian Revolution under Jamal Abdul Nasser in 1952. The Zionist leaders portrayed the events of 1948 as their inheritance of the Mandate from the British. As for the Palestinians, the aftermath of the War was simply “the *Nakba*” – “the Catastrophe.”

In the late 1950s through the early 1960s, the British, the United States, Australia, and Canada, along with UN Secretary General Dag Hammarskjöld, tried to solve the Palestine problem, but the 1956 Suez War escalated tensions and halted progress. A study by the US State Department in 1962 led to the revival of the United Nations Special Committee on Palestine (UNSCOP) and the reaffirmation of the necessity to enforce Resolution 194, resolving that “refugees wishing to return to their homes and live at peace with their neighbors should be permitted to do so at the earliest practicable date, and that compensation should be paid for the property of those choosing not to return and for loss of or damage to property which, under principles of international law or equity, should be made good by the Governments or authorities responsible.”

In 1964, Arab states formed the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) to establish a central representative for the Palestinian people; Ahmad Shuqueri was the first chairman.

THE JUNE WAR OF 1967 AND ISRAELI OCCUPATION OF THE REST OF PALESTINE

Periodic attacks along its Syrian front and lack of stability along its Jordanian and Egyptian borders reflected a cycle of violence between Israel and its neighbors. Egypt ordered the United Nations to withdraw its peacekeeping forces remaining from the 1956 conflict from the buffer zone between Egypt and Israel. This was followed by Egypt’s closing (again) the Straits of Tiran, something that it had committed to *not* doing in the ceasefire from the 1956 war between Israel and Egypt. In June 1967, Israel launched what it called a “preemptive” strike against Egypt and Syria in response to their aggressive statements and actions; this later expanded when Jordan entered the fighting on the Arab side. The Arab-Israeli conflict entered a new chapter with the 1967 war, which led to the two major Palestinian communities of Gaza and the West Bank, including Jerusalem, coming under one system of military occupation. This marked the beginning of the Palestinization of the conflict

Points Passed by the Central Committee, January 1969.

See Document 42. PLO-Lebanese ("Cairo") Agreement, Cairo, 3 November 1969.

See Document 43. Government of Israel, Basic Foreign Policy Principles, Jerusalem, 15 December 1969.

See Document 44. Spokesman of the PLO Executive Committee, Kamal Nasser, Statement on Municipal Elections in the West Bank, February 1972.

See Document 45. King Hussein of Jordan, United Arab Kingdom Plan, Amman, 15 March 1972.

See Document 46. Spokesman of the PLO Executive Committee, Kamal Nasser, Reply to King Hussein's Proposed Plan for the West Bank, Beirut, 16 March 1972.

See Document 47. League of Arab States, Secret Resolutions, Summit Conference, Algiers, 4 December 1973.

in terms of resistance, political initiatives, and subsequent challenges.

The UN condemned the 1967 Israeli attacks on Arab states and called for Israel to refrain from occupying Arab territories, citing international law as the basis for this call. The UN Security Council passed Resolution 242, calling for Israel to withdraw its army from the occupied territories. Also, in 1967 Arab leaders called for Israeli withdrawal, and refused the possibility of recognizing Israel.

Palestinian nationalism continued to grow. In 1968, a Palestinian National Charter was published, composed of resolutions of the Palestine National Council. These resolutions were based upon documents dating back to January 1964, when at the Arab summit in Cairo a strategic decision was made to organize the Palestinian people. They permitted the PLO to continue armed struggle against Israel. In February 1969, at the Fifth Palestine National Congress, Fateh became the dominant faction of the PLO; Yasser Arafat was elected chairman and began to change the PLO into a wider umbrella organization open to all Palestinian factions.

Throughout the 1970s, there were several attempts by intermediaries to find political solutions for the conflict. The first was a plan by King Hussein of Jordan for a unified Arab kingdom that merged Jordan and the West Bank.

The 1973 War again generated international activity to contribute to stability and peace. In that war, in a surprise attack Egypt and Syria invaded Israel on October 6, 1973. Initially Egyptian forces retook the Sinai and allied Syrian forces retook the Golan Heights. The Israeli military subsequently found its footing, however, and eventually the military tides turned. At the end of two weeks, Israel had pushed Egypt back through the Sinai and across the Suez. Moreover, Israel had pushed back so far on Syrian forces that its troops were within 20 miles of Damascus. The conflict, known by Israelis as the Yom Kippur War and by Arabs as the October War, concluded with Israel once again solidly the victor.

Following the war, there was more inter-Arab consultation. A summit of the League of Arab States called for evacuation by Israel of occupied Arab territories, especially Jerusalem, and return of national rights for the Palestinians. The Palestine National Council, at its 12th session in 1974 continued to reject UN Resolution 242 and called

See Document 48. Palestine National Council, Political Program Adopted at Its 12th Session, Cairo, 8 June 1974.

See Document 49. Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), Statement Announcing Withdrawal from the PLO Executive Committee, Beirut, 26 September 1974.

See Document 50. League of Arab States, Communiqué of the 7th Arab Summit Conference, Rabat, 28 October 1974.

See Document 51. UN General Assembly, Resolution 3237 Granting Observer Status to the Palestine Liberation Organization, New York, 22 November 1974.

See Document 52. UN General Assembly, Resolution 3375 (XXX) Inviting the PLO to Participate in the Efforts for Peace in the Middle East, New York, 10 November 1975.

See Document 53. Palestinian National Council, Political

for continued struggle against Israel. In a sign of intra-Palestinian conflict, in 1974 the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine withdrew from the PLO Executive Committee (but not from the PLO) following the creation of the PLO's Ten Point Program, accusing the PLO of abandoning the goal of destroying Israel in favor of a binational solution to the territorial conflict. At the 1974 (Seventh) Arab League Summit the group passed a number of resolutions on Palestine, affirming the right of the Palestinian people to self-determination, urging Syria, Egypt, and Jordan to work with the Palestine Liberation Organization to help to ensure that outcome, and supporting the actions of the PLO as "the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people."

POST-GENEVA CONFERENCE – EGYPTIAN-ISRAELI PEACE TREATY (1974–1979)

In November 1974, the United Nations granted observer status to the Palestinian Liberation Organization. This again placed the Palestinian Question at center-stage in the Arab-Israeli conflict. The PLO meanwhile established a "mini-state" in Lebanon, and Yasser Arafat delivered his first speech to the UN calling for a united Palestine with a secular government and equality for all citizens, Arab or Israeli.

In 1975, an Egyptian-Israeli interim peace agreement was signed, providing for a separation of forces between the two parties, a UN-supervised buffer zone, Israeli and Egyptian electronic surveillance stations, and an additional station to be manned by American civilian technicians. The agreement was to be in force for at least three years, with annual extensions. Although this did not directly affect Palestinian nationalism, it did provide a breakthrough in Israeli-Egyptian relations, leading to a peace agreement several years later.

Various Israeli plans were proposed in this period to deal with the Palestinians. In 1976 the Foreign Minister (Yigal Allon) proposed an autonomous Palestine under Israeli sovereignty and an extension of Israeli borders eastward to the Jordan Valley. Prime Minister Begin proposed a similar plan in 1977. Neither of these received positive reaction from Palestinian leaders. At the same time, Israeli settlements in the Occupied Territories were generating international criticism of Israeli policy, even from Israel's strongest supporters.

Declaration, 12th Session, Cairo, 22 March 1977.

See Document 54. UN General Assembly, Resolution 32/5 on Israeli Settlements in the Territories, New York, 28 October 1977.

See Document 55. PLO Factions, Six-Point Program Calling for the Formation of a 'Steadfastness and Confrontation Front' against Sadat's Negotiations with Israel, 4 December 1977.

See Document 56. Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin, Proposed Autonomy Plan for the Palestinians, Jerusalem, 28 December 1977.

See Document 57. Office of the Legal Advisor of the US State Department, Opinion to the US Congress, Declaring that Israeli Settlements are Inconsistent with International Law, 21 April 1978.

See Document 58. Government of Egypt, Proposals Relative to Withdrawal from

US President Jimmy Carter took on the task of bringing about a formal peace agreement between Israel and Egypt during his single term in office. Following an intense two-week period of negotiations at the presidential retreat at Camp David, Maryland, the Egyptian-Israeli Peace Agreement was reached in 1978. President Sadat of Egypt was adamant that he would not sign a peace treaty with Israel without first signing an agreement that included real progress on the Palestinian question, so two separate documents were negotiated there, one dealing with a Middle East peace (included here) and one dealing exclusively with Egyptian-Israeli peace (not included here). Egyptian-Israeli peace was formally declared in Washington D.C. in March 1979.

FROM THE EGYPTIAN-ISRAELI PEACE TREATY TO THE 1ST INTIFADA (1979–1987)

In Baghdad in 1979, Arab governments reacted to Egypt's treaty with Israel by boycotting Egypt, suspending its membership in the Arab League, and moving the League's headquarters from Cairo to Tunis. They planned a ten-year assistance program for the Palestinian people in recognition of the ongoing Israeli occupation.

Israel continued its policies of settlement in the occupied territories and undermined Palestinian leadership when it could. It entrenched Jerusalem as its capital in a Basic Law in July 1980. Several new international peace initiatives were presented in 1982: the Prince Fahd Plan, the Brezhnev Plan, the EEC Paris Statement, and the Reagan Plan. All these plans acknowledged Palestinian autonomy and Israeli security concerns. The 1982 Arab Summit endorsed the Prince Fahd Plan and called for a Palestinian state.

From its Lebanon base, the PLO continued to confront the Israeli army. The Lebanon civil war and Israeli invasion of Lebanon was costly for the Palestinian people, most notably in the 1982 massacres at Sabra and Shatila refugee camps on September 16, 1982. Although the forces behind the deaths of hundreds of Palestinians were Lebanese Christians, Israel was implicated in the disaster because the camps were in territory controlled by Israel. Critics argued that the Israelis should have protected the victims of the slaughter from the Christian militias. At the time, international and domestic dismay was sufficient to cause the resignation of then-Defense Minister Ariel Sharon in

the West Bank and Gaza and Security Arrangements ("Egyptian Six-Point Peace Plan"), 3 July 1978.

See Document 59. "The Camp David Accords" – Framework for Peace in the Middle East, Camp David, 17 September 1978.

See Document 60. West Bank National Conference, Statement Rejecting the Camp David Accords, Beit Hanina, Jerusalem, 1 October 1978.

See Document 61. Peace Treaty between Israel and Egypt. Washington, D.C., 26 March 1979.

See Document 62. Government of Israel, Model for the Self-Governing Authority, 16 January 1980.

See Document 63. UN General Assembly, Resolution ES-7/2 on the Question of Palestine, New York, 29 July 1980.

See Document 64. Government of Israel, Israeli Basic Law: Jerusalem, Capital of Israel, Knesset, 30 July 1980.

1983. Soon after the PLO left Lebanon and relocated to Tunis. Meanwhile, the Government of Jordan, which had been negotiating with the PLO about future Jordan-PLO relations, broke off its negotiations with the PLO.

In February 1985, in their first substantive meeting since the 17th PNC meeting of November 1984, it was announced that King Hussein and Yasser Arafat had agreed on a political plan to end the occupation. Their agreement included the principle of exchanging territory for peace, the right of self-determination for the Palestinian people within the framework of a Palestinian state, a Jordanian-Palestinian confederation, and a comprehensive settlement under the umbrella of an international conference at which the Palestinians would be represented in a joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation. In that agreement, Jordan committed to follow the positions of the Arab States and the United Nations regarding the Palestine question, calling for an end of Israeli occupation of Palestine and the withdrawal of Israel from the territories occupied in 1967 and the right of self-determination for the Palestinian people. The PNC endorsed the accord with Jordan for cooperation in building a Palestinian-Jordanian confederation, but this was never implemented.

Later that year, in November 1985, Yasser Arafat delivered a speech that became known as the "Cairo Declaration," in which he pledged to suspend PLO military operations outside of Israel and not to attack civilians inside of Israel. He did not, however, renounce all forms of violence against Israel, and he appeared to introduce some ambiguity in his position by declaring that the PLO "reiterates the right of the Palestinian people to fight against Israeli occupation in all possible ways."

FIRST INTIFADA TO THE MADRID MIDDLE EAST PEACE CONFERENCE (1987–1991)

At the beginning of 1987 the Israeli occupation had been ongoing for 20 years, the PLO leadership was isolated in Tunis, and Arab governments were unable to influence matters. On 8th December 1987 an Israeli vehicle crashed into a crowd at a Gaza refugee camp killing four residents. Palestinians were convinced this was a deliberate attack and the ensuing uprising that spread throughout the Palestinian territories became known as the *Intifada* ("uprising," or "rebellion").

See Document 65.
PLO Executive
Committee, State-
ment on Jerusalem,
Damascus, 1 August
1980.

See Document 66.
UN Security Council,
Resolution 478 on
Jerusalem, New York,
20 August 1980.

See Document 67.
Foreign Minister
Prince Fahd of
Saudi Arabia, Eight-
Point Peace Plan
("Fahd Plan"), 6
August 1981.

See Document 68.
Government of
Israel, Proposals
for the Self-
Governing
Authority in
the Territories
("Autonomy Plan"),
31 January 1982.

See Document 69.
League of Arab
States, Final
Declaration of the
12th Arab Summit
Conference ("Fez
Plan"), Fez, 9 Sep-
tember 1982.

See Document 70.
Report of the
Commission of
Inquiry into the
Events at the
Refugee Camps
in Beirut ("Kahan
Commission"), 8
February 1983.

The Intifada was an attempt to change the occupation from the inside, without relying on ineffective external intermediaries. It produced new leadership for the PLO from within the territories, organized numerous factions under one umbrella (the Unified National Leadership of the Uprising), and politicized the population. This unification led in January 1988 to the "Fourteen Points" Palestinian proposal, that included proposals for elections, a freeze on Israeli settlements, release of political prisoners, and the right to be free of occupation. The US government tried to encourage negotiation with the Shultz Initiative in 1988, which called for negotiations based on UN resolutions 242 and 338, but this was rejected by the Palestinians, and Israel continued its military control of the territories.

In July 1988, King Hussein announced the severance of all legal and administrative ties with the West Bank (except for the custodianship of the Muslim and Christian holy sites in Jerusalem) and recognized the PLO as "the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people." He explained that the goal of this move was to allow the PLO to take more responsibility for the land and people of Palestine.

The PLO shifted also, with a new consensus passed by the Palestinian National Council (PNC) in November 1988 to: accept partition based on UN Resolution 181; to accept the existence of Israel; to renounce terrorism; and to call for a settlement based on UN Resolutions 181 and 242. The PNC issued a declaration of Palestinian Independence on 15 November 1988 which called for a Palestinian state with Jerusalem as its capital.

On 13 December 1988, PLO Chairman Yasser Arafat addressed the UN for the second time. He presented a Palestinian initiative which included a call for an international peace conference based on UN Resolutions 242 and 338; a call for a temporary presence of UN supervision troops in the Occupied Palestinian Territories (OPT); and an assurance of the Palestinian desire for a comprehensive settlement to the conflict. The following day, US President Reagan authorized the State Department to begin a dialogue with the PLO.

Israeli Prime Minister Rabin responded in April 1989 with a plan for Israel to hold elections in the OPT in order to choose representatives to negotiate with Israel on an interim peace plan. The Palestinians maintained that the PLO was their legitimate representative body and rejected this proposal. From this point until the 1990 Gulf Crisis,

See Document 71.
Government of
Jordan, Communiqué on the End
of Negotiations
with the PLO,
Amman, Jordan, 10
April 1983.

See Document 72.
Joint Palestinian-
Jordanian
Accords, I I
February 1985.

See Document 73.
PLO Chairman
Yasser Arafat, State-
ment on Terrorism
("The Cairo Dec-
laration"), Cairo, 7
November 1985.

See Document 74.
Palestine Libera-
tion Organization,
Three Proposals
Submitted to
American and Jor-
danian Negotiators,
Clarifying the
PLO's Positions on
the Peace Process,
Amman, 5 February
1986.

See Document 75.
The Palestinian
Fourteen (14)
Points, Jerusalem,
14 January 1988.

See Document 76.
King Hussein of
Jordan, Speech on
Jordan's Disen-
gagement from the
West Bank, Amman,
31 July 1988.

various peace initiatives were introduced by Arab, Euro-
pean, and US leaders; none of these succeeded, but they
contributed to the sense of a dialogue, and aired points
of view of the parties in the peace talks that followed the
Gulf War.

In that war Yasser Arafat had supported Saddam Hussein
and Iraq. Baghdad had been, along with Kuwait, a major
financial supporter of the Palestinians before the war, and
when Iraq invaded Kuwait in 1990, Arafat had to choose
which side to support. He chose Baghdad. Because Baghdad
lost the war, this left the Palestinians at the end of the war in
1991 relatively isolated in the Arab world, cut off from their
major financial backers of Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, with
thousands of Palestinian refugees having been kicked out of
the Gulf states, and under great pressure to moderate their
position with Israel.

THE FIRST ROUNDS OF NEGOTIATIONS (1991–1993)

The Madrid Peace Conference of October 1991 repre-
sented the beginning of the first series of bilateral talks in
the Arab-Israeli conflict based on the UN Resolutions 242
and 338 and the acceptance by all parties of the principle
of "land for peace." Palestinians were included as part of a
Jordanian-Palestinian delegation. On the table were ques-
tions of bilateral peace treaties between Israel and each of
its neighbors, as well as issues of economic cooperation
and development in the region as a whole. From Madrid,
two tracks of negotiations emerged: bilateral in Washington
from 1991 to 1993, and multilateral starting in Moscow in
1992. The bilateral talks came to a halt after 22 months,
when the Israeli side proposed autonomy while the Pales-
tinian side demanded an interim self-government authority
with direct elections. The multilateral talks moved to vari-
ous world capitals covering issues of mutual concern, such
as arms control, regional economic development, refugees,
and water and environment.

The failure of the Madrid structure revealed the gap
between the two sides and the reluctance of the US admin-
istration to exercise any pressure on Israel. Facing such a
dead end, several secret channels were opened between the
PLO and Israeli Government; one of them led to the Oslo
Accords and the Declaration of Principles (DoP), which was
signed at the White House on 13 September 1993.

See Document 77.
Palestinian National
Council, Declara-
tion of Independ-
ence, Algiers, 15
November 1988.

See Document 78.
US President
Ronald Reagan,
Statement on
US-PLO Dialogue,
Washington, DC,
14 December 1988.

See Document 79.
Palestinian West
Bank Leaders,
Letter Rejecting
Israel's Election
Plan, 27 April 1989.

See Document 80.
Israeli Government,
Peace Initiative:
Plan for Elections
in the Occupied
Territories, Jerusa-
lem, 15 May 1989.

See Document 81.
US President
George H.W.
Bush, Statement
Announcing the
Decision to Sus-
pend the PLO-US
Dialogue, Hunts-
ville, Alabama, 20
June 1990.

See Document 82.
Palestine Libera-
tion Organization,
Statement on the
Gulf Crisis, Tunis,
19 August 1990.

See Document 83.
Palestinian Memo-
randum to

In August 1993, the PLO revealed a breakthrough: Israel and Palestinian representatives had reached something approximating an agreement. The two sides formally agreed to the Oslo Accords, named after the city where the secret negotiations had occurred. The Accords allowed for partial autonomy for a Palestinian Authority in the Gaza Strip and in Jericho. On September 13, 1993, in Washington D.C., Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin and PLO Chairman Yasser Arafat met and watched Israeli Foreign Minister Shimon Peres and PLO Executive Committee Member Mahmoud Abbas sign the Oslo Agreement, witnessed by President Bill Clinton, former presidents George H. W. Bush and Jimmy Carter, and other dignitaries. The next day, Israel and Jordan agreed to an Israel-Jordan Common Agenda, marking the end of the state of war between the two countries and paving the way for talks leading to a formal peace treaty.

The significance of the Oslo breakthrough was mutual recognition, and a feeling that it might, indeed, be possible to reach agreement on difficult questions. Progress toward a normalization of relations continued to be made the next year. In May 1994, the Gaza-Jericho Agreement was signed. This brought about a withdrawal of Israeli forces and administration from specific areas of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, and also described the transfer of powers and responsibilities to the Palestine National Authority, with specific attention paid to security arrangements.

In 1994, much attention was focused on the continuing negotiations that took place in Taba and elsewhere. At the end of April, the Palestinian-Israeli Protocol on Economic Relations was signed in Paris, followed, on 4 May, by the Gaza-Jericho Autonomy Agreement, or Cairo Agreement. Soon after, the first Palestinian police forces entered the autonomous areas of Gaza and Jericho and began to set up a national, preventive, public, and presidential security system. On 1 July, PLO Chairman Yasser Arafat returned home and swore in the first ministers for the newly established Palestinian National Authority (PNA).

Since the agreed deadline for Palestinian elections (13 July) had passed, the next major event was the August signing of the Early Empowerment Agreement on the transfer of five civilian authorities (education, health,

US Secretary of State James Baker, Jerusalem, 12 March 1991.

See Document 84. Palestinian National Council, Political Statement, 20th Session, Algiers, 28 September 1991.

See Document 85. Joint US-USSR Letter of Invitation to the Madrid Peace Conference, 18 October 1991.

See Document 86. Madrid Peace Conference – Closing Speeches: Remarks by Haidar Abdul Shafi, Head of the Palestinian Delegation, 1 November 1991.

See Document 87. Palestinian Delegation, “Outline of Model of the Palestinian Interim Self-Government Authority (PISGA)”, Washington, DC, 14 January 1992.

See Document 88. Palestinian Delegation, Memorandum to US Secretary of State James Baker, Jerusalem, 20 July 1992.

See Document 89. Palestinian Delegation, Letter to the

social affairs, tourism, and taxation) from the Israeli military administration to the PNA. In September, Jordan transferred to the PNA the Waqf and religious courts in the West Bank, and the Gulf Cooperation Council ended its economic boycott of Israel. In October, Arafat, Rabin, and Peres were announced the winners of the 1994 Nobel Peace Prize. They delivered Nobel Lectures on December 10, 1994, articulating their visions of peace and the future of the Middle East. (While those speeches are not included in this volume, they can be found at the Nobel Prize Organization website: www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/peace/laureates/1994/.)

CONTINUING NEGOTIATIONS

During 1995, Palestinian and Israeli officials held numerous meetings and eventually signed the “Oslo II” Interim Agreement in Washington on 28 September, detailing mechanisms for, and limitations of, the extension of Palestinian self-rule to significant portions of the West Bank. The agreement divided the West Bank, excluding East Jerusalem, into Area A (comprising major towns where the PNA gained administrative control with Israel retaining certain security duties – excluding Hebron, to which Israel redeployed); Area B (with Palestinian villages coming under PNA civil authority, but with Israel retaining overall “security responsibility”); and Area C (Jewish settlements and “militarily sensitive” areas, where Israel remained in full control).

Momentum continued, and within a month the negotiators had completed a “Framework for the Conclusion of a Final Status Agreement” between Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization. In the agreement, both parties recognized and respected each other’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, renounced the use of force, and committed themselves to a peaceful resolution of disputes. Israelis living in settlements in the Occupied Territories would be subject to Palestinian sovereignty and the Palestinian rule of law, and Jerusalem would be an open and undivided city. Palestinian refugees from 1947–1949 would be entitled to compensation and rehabilitation for their losses.

On November 4, 1995, Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin was assassinated by an Orthodox Jewish student. He was succeeded by Shimon Peres, who did not have the political

Israeli Delegation on the Progress of the Peace Talks, Washington, DC, 19 November 1992.

See Document 90. Palestinian Delegation, Draft Proposal for a Declaration of Principles, Tunis, 9 May 1993.

See Document 91. Faisal Hussein, Memorandum to Special US Middle East Coordinator Dennis Ross, Jerusalem, 1 July 1993.

See Document 92. Secret Oslo Signing Ceremony: Speeches at the Conclusion of the Declaration of Principles, Oslo, 20 August 1993.

See Document 93. PLO and Israel, Exchanged Letters of Mutual Recognition, 9 September 1993.

See Document 94. PLO Executive Committee, Statement on the Declaration of Principles, Tunis, 12 September 1993.

See Document 95. Palestinian-Israeli Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-

support that Rabin had possessed. With the resulting political uncertainty in Israel following Rabin's assassination, the momentum toward peace slowed considerably.

In April 1996, President Arafat and Prime Minister Peres resumed their talks and confirmed the commencement of the final status talks in May. A few days later, the PNC met for the first time since 1964 on Palestinian soil and voted to amend the PLO Covenant in accordance with the Oslo stipulations.

In June 1996, the Israeli Labor party lost seats in the elections for the 14th Knesset and the Likud party won a plurality; Benjamin Netanyahu became Prime Minister. National security was a significant issue in the election campaign, and the government of Benjamin Netanyahu took a markedly different approach to the peace process, an approach that has come to characterize his attitude toward the peace process from that time to the present.

Despite increased suspicions and a "cooling down" of the peace process under Netanyahu, negotiations continued, and in January 1997 the Hebron Protocol was signed, dividing the city of Hebron into H1 and H2 zones, with Israel retaining full security control over the settlement enclaves in the H2 section and security responsibility for the rest of Hebron going to the Palestinian Authority.

In the spring of 1997, King Hussein reached out to Prime Minister Netanyahu to complain about some of the Netanyahu government's policies regarding the Palestinians, policies that had been negotiated with agreements reached under the Rabin government. Netanyahu's reply was unsympathetic, indicating that he had been chosen by the Israeli public in June 1996 as the result of a less-than-complete peace process and violence in Lebanon, and suggesting that Israel and Jordan had "faced worse crises in the past than the problem we are facing today."

In August 1997, fears about the Netanyahu government's commitment to the peace process were confirmed when the Israeli cabinet voted unanimously to cancel restrictions on settlement development in the West Bank and Gaza, in disregard of the spirit of the Oslo agreements. This was followed by the provocative opening of a tunnel under the Haram Ash-Sharif/Al-Aqsa Mosque compound on 24 September that led to clashes between Palestinians protestors and Israeli forces, during which 62 Palestinians were killed and over 1,600 injured (with 14 Israeli soldiers killed and 50 wounded).

Government
Authority (DOP),
White House,
Washington, DC,
13 September
1993.

See Document 96.
King Hussein of
Jordan, Address
to the Parlia-
ment, Amman, 23
November 1993.

See Document 97.
Gaza-Jericho
Autonomy
Agreement ("Cairo
Agreement"),
Cairo, 4 May 1994.

See Document 98.
Palestinian-Israeli
Interim Agreement
on the West Bank
and Gaza Strip
("Oslo II"), Wash-
ington, DC, 28
September 1995.

See Document 99.
Framework for the
Conclusion of a
Final Status Agree-
ment between
Israel and the
Palestine Libera-
tion Organization
(the "Beilin-Abu
Mazen Final Status
Agreement"), 31
October 1995.

See Document 100.
Palestinian National
Council, Revision
of the Palestinian
National Covenant,
21st Session, Gaza,
24 April 1996.

The next crisis erupted soon after, when Israel announced plans to construct a new settlement ("Har Homa") at Jabal Abu Ghneim in Jerusalem, followed by the US House of Representatives' 10 June vote to recognize Jerusalem as the capital of Israel. The political situation continued to deteriorate when Israel responded to a 30 July double suicide bombing in Jerusalem's Mahane Yehuda market with a total sealing of the OPT and a wide-spread arrest campaign during which the Israeli army was authorized to operate "if necessary" inside Palestinian-controlled territory.

Over the next several years, international leaders attempted to keep the Israeli-Arab peace process moving forward. The year 1998 began with increased Israeli settlement activity and a stalemate in the peace talks. The PNA turned down proposals to override the third phase for redeployment, while Washington repeatedly asked Israel to carry out serious further withdrawal. Throughout the first quarter of the year, clashes between Palestinians and the Israeli army occurred frequently.

Later, in 1998, the US hosted a meeting at the Wye River Conference Center in Maryland, where President Clinton and Secretary of State Madeleine Albright met with Prime Minister Netanyahu and President Arafat. The product of that meeting, known as the Wye River Memorandum, demonstrated that even a hardline Israeli government could arrive at some form of agreement with its Palestinian neighbors. The Wye River Memorandum, outlined a revised timetable for the phased implementation of the first and second further redeployments stipulated in the 1995 Oslo II Accords. Stage I was completed in November 1998, while the implementation of stages II and III (due by 31 January 1999) were indefinitely postponed by the Netanyahu government in December.

January 1999 saw Israel heavily criticized by European Foreign Ministers for not implementing the Wye River agreement. In February, the UN General Assembly voted overwhelmingly in favor of a resolution calling upon Israel to cease all settlement construction immediately, the only two votes against the resolution coming from Israel and the US. Nonetheless, the rhetoric of Ehud Barak and Benjamin Netanyahu as they prepared for the coming Israeli elections left the Palestinians with little hope for the future. Barak's eventual election win on 17 May was accompanied by his confirmation that

See Document 101. PLO and Israel Negotiation Delegations, Joint Communiqué, First Session of the Permanent Status Negotiations, Taba, 6 May 1996.

See Document 102. Palestinian and Israeli Negotiation Delegations, Agreement on the Temporary International Presence in the City of Hebron (TIPH), 9 May 1996.

See Document 103. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, Speech on Presenting the New Government, Knesset, Jerusalem, 18 June 1996.

See Document 104. Palestinian Authority, List of Israeli Violations of the Oslo Agreement, Gaza, 15 July 1996.

See Document 105. Israeli Government Press Office, Major PLO Violations of the Oslo Accords, Jerusalem, 25 October 1996.

See Document 106. Palestinian Delegation to the Peace Talks, Issues Awaiting Implementation by the Israeli Government

he would make no concessions on the issues of Jerusalem, borders, or established settlements in Palestinian territory.

In early July, the UN General Assembly upgraded Palestine's representation, allowing it to put its signature as "co-sponsor" on proposed resolutions.

By the time Ehud Barak and Yasser Arafat met in Sharm el-Sheikh in September 1999, little progress had been made in advancing the "peace process." Barak's vow to dismantle illegal West Bank outposts was matched by an increase in settlement expansion, and sporadic violence continued to punctuate daily life among the Palestinians. The "Sharm el-Sheikh Memorandum on Implementation Timeline of Outstanding Commitments of Agreements Signed and the Resumption of Permanent Status Negotiations" laid out a three-stage timetable for the completion of the second further redeployment of Oslo II. The purpose of the Memorandum was to implement the Interim Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip (known as "Oslo II") of September 1995 and to implement other agreements between the PLO and Israel since September 1993 that were not moving forward as quickly as parties might have liked.

FROM SHARM EL-SHEIKH TO TABA

The period that came in the immediate aftermath of the Sharm el-Sheikh memorandum began with cautious optimism. A measure of progress was made in the months that followed the agreement between Prime Minister Barak and President Arafat, including an agreement on "Safe Passage between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip," which was intended to contribute to the normalization of life of the Palestinians living under occupation by making it easier to travel from the West Bank to Gaza – through Israel – and return. It was never implemented by Israel. By the end of 1999, Arafat and Barak had worked with President Clinton to push for a final peace agreement, yet many in Palestinian society remained wary of the high hopes espoused by the leaders. Their skepticism would be validated by mid-2000, when the process all but collapsed and the region fell into a state of violence.

In July 2000, US President Bill Clinton invited Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak and PNA Chairman Yasser Arafat to Camp David. Clinton hoped that in his final

in Accordance with the Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement on the West Bank and Gaza Strip, November 1996.

See Document 107. Protocol Concerning the Redeployment in Hebron ("Hebron Agreement"), 15 January 1997.

See Document 108. King Hussein of Jordan, Letter to Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu on the Peace Process, Amman, 9 March 1997.

See Document 109. Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu, Reply to King Hussein's Letter, Jerusalem, 10 March 1997.

See Document 110. President Yasser Arafat, Address to the Conference on the Implementation of the Oslo Accords, Gaza, 15 March 1997.

See Document 111. Palestinian Chief Negotiator Sa'eb Erekat, Letter to US, EU and Other International Representatives Regarding Israeli Settlement Expansion in the Gaza Strip, 25 April 1997.

weeks in office he might be able to press the leaders to reach a lasting agreement to move the parties forward toward a Middle East peace. The meetings were not successful. Although the final statement from the meeting tried to sound as though the meeting had been a success, leaders were disappointed. For his part, Clinton was eager to secure his legacy, wanting to be seen by history as the American president who mediated an end to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. He made several attempts at Camp David to empower Arafat and Barak to move toward a landmark achievement, but both were "prisoners" of their domestic and personal agendas, i.e., personal and political survival, as well as the balance of power on the ground and a fear of betrayal by outsiders.

Instability within the Israeli political elite increased in the immediate aftermath of the Camp David failure, and it became clear that hawkish Ariel Sharon would likely succeed Barak after new Israeli elections. As Sharon prepared to send a message with his provocative visit to the Haram Al-Sharif/Al-Aqsa Mosque, Palestinian leaders made strong and ultimately unsuccessful efforts to publicly dissuade him from doing so. The "visit" sparked a series of demonstrations in the OPT and enflamed passions across the Arab and Muslim world. Barak, already politically fragile, ordered a crackdown with maximum force. By the time of the first Israeli casualties – two weeks, 80 Palestinians dead, and hundreds wounded later – when two Israeli reserve soldiers were killed under chilling circumstances in Ramallah on October 12, the violence had gained a momentum of its own.

The year 2001 began with President Clinton making one final push for a peace agreement. Despite their reservations, Arafat and Barak went along for what proved to be another unsuccessful ride. The two sides quickly moved on to yet another peace effort, this time in Taba from January 21–27, 2001. Over the six days of the summit, the Israeli and Palestinian negotiation teams came as close to an agreement as ever, but the talks ended once again with no tangible decisions in place. Both sides had sent competent and willing negotiators who were well received by their counterparts, but the backdrop of impending Israeli elections and continuing violence proved to be too much for the decision-makers to overcome.

The PLO released a draft of a new Constitution in February 2001.

See Document 112.
Israel and the Palestinian Authority, Memorandum of Security Understandings, 17 December 1997.

See Document 113.
Hamas, Statement to President Yasser Arafat Regarding the Negotiations with the Palestinian Authority, 18 June 1998.

See Document 114.
The Wye River Memo, The White House, Washington, DC, 23 October 1998.

See Document 115.
Resolutions of the Palestinian Opposition Conference ('Palestinian National Conference'), Damascus, 12–13 December 1998.

See Document 116.
PLO Chairman Yasser Arafat, Speech at the Palestinian Conference to Affirm Renunciation of the PLO Charter, Gaza, 14 December 1998.

See Document 117.
Government of Israel, Position on Expansion of Settlements, Jerusalem, 27 April 1999.

INCREASING VIOLENCE POST-TABA

The year 2001 was a deadly and demoralizing year for the Palestinians. The sudden loss of Faisal Husseini in May was a saddening blow to the Palestinian cause, especially with regard to leadership in Jerusalem. Within months, Israeli forces had occupied and shut down the Orient House, which was the PLO/PNA representation and national political address of Palestinians in Jerusalem, and other Palestinian institutions with ties to the PNA.

On April 30, 2001, the Sharm el-Sheikh Fact-Finding Committee, chaired by former US Senator George Mitchell, issued its final report on what could be done to break the cycle of violence that had developed between Israel and the Palestinians, and how the Israeli-Palestinian negotiations might be reenergized. The report singled out Ariel Sharon's "visit" on September 28, 2000, to the "Temple Mount" area (i.e., the Al-Aqsa Mosque) as significant in the start of the *Al-Aqsa Intifada*, also known as the Second Intifada, and suggested that Israeli settlement building, Palestinian acts of terrorism, Israeli military responses to those acts, and injudicious public statements on both sides had all contributed to the cycle of violence in the Middle East.

The violence from both sides only continued to escalate in 2002, culminating with the large-scale Israeli military incursion into the West Bank known as "Operation Defensive Shield." Bethlehem, Nablus, Jenin, and Ramallah all came under a blanket of curfews, arrests, and the use of heavy weaponry by the Israeli army. President Arafat was isolated in his compound, the PNA headquarters in Ramallah, as international calls for Israeli withdrawal went ignored. In May the Palestinian government released its Basic Law. In June, the implementation of an Israeli plan to build a separation wall began despite the barrier's planned route drawing widespread local and international criticism for reaching far into the West Bank. All the while, illegal military operations and extraditions continued throughout the West Bank as the prospects for a sovereign and democratic Palestinian state continued to dwindle.

In July, a new proposal surfaced for an Israeli-Palestinian peace, the Nusseibeh-Ayalon Agreement, proposed by PLO Jerusalem representative Sari Nusseibeh, and former Chief of Israel's Shin Bet, Ami Ayalon. The Agreement was shorter than many of the preceding attempts at solutions, and more direct: two states for two peoples, borders

See Document 118. Sharm El-Sheikh Memorandum on Implementation Timeline of Outstanding Commitments of Agreements Signed and the Resumption of Permanent Status Negotiations, 4 September 1999.

See Document 119. US Letter of Assurance to PLO Chairman Yasser Arafat, 8 September 1999.

See Document 120. Protocol Concerning Safe Passage between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, 5 October 1999.

See Document 121. Petition of the Twenty, "A Call from the Homeland," Palestine, 27 November 1999.

See Document 122. Palestinian Political Personalities, Reconciliation Document, 1 December 1999.

See Document 123. Palestinian Intellectuals, "Message to the Israeli and Jewish Public," March 2000.

based on the June 4, 1967, lines, an open Jerusalem, a right for Palestinian refugees to return to the new State of Palestine, a demilitarized Palestine, and an end to the conflict.

THE ROAD MAP AND STAGNATING PEACE

Along with the UN, the European Union, and Russia, the US proposed in 2003 what became known as the "Roadmap for Peace," and the four sponsors became known as "The Quartet." The Roadmap reiterated the call for a two-state solution, but designed the normalization process to be implemented based on the achievement of certain goals. That is, rather than imposing an external timeline on the peace process, the Roadmap called on Israel and the PNA to meet certain benchmarks of goodwill and development, at which point the next phase of the plan would begin. The early focus of the plan was on reform and recovery within the Palestinian economic and political systems, to be accompanied by a halt to Israeli settlement activity and the beginning of withdrawal.

As international observers, most notably the members of the Middle East Quartet, worked to break the impasse between the Palestinians and Israelis, internal bickering continued to swell within the Palestinian political structure. In March, Mahmoud Abbas was appointed to the role of Prime Minister of the PNA by Yasser Arafat and inherited a number of setbacks. The US had frozen all aid to the Palestinians and begun its war in Iraq, and Palestinians were already losing confidence in the empty promises of the Road Map. By September, Prime Minister Abbas had resigned and been replaced by Ahmed Qrei'a, a close aide to Arafat and one of the architects of Oslo.

Meanwhile, the Israeli government of Ariel Sharon was losing patience working with Yasser Arafat. In September 2003, a cabinet communique announced the intention "to eliminate the terrorist organizations and take all appropriate measures against their leaders . . . until their criminal activity is halted." This including stating "that Yasser Arafat is a complete obstacle to any process of reconciliation," and stating that "Israel will work to remove this obstacle in a manner, and at a time, of its choosing."

In the shadow of the growing separation barrier in the West Bank, there was little change in the status quo during the latter half of 2003. The Geneva Accord process that was

See Document 124.
Trilateral Statement
on the Middle East
Summit, Camp
David, Maryland, 25
July 2000.

See Document 125.
US President
Clinton, Remarks
on Returning from
Camp David, Mary-
land, 25 July 2000.

See Document 126.
Mahmoud Abbas,
Report on the
Camp David Summit
to the PLO Central
Council, Gaza, 9
September 2000.

See Document 127.
Palestinian
Academics and
Activists, Urgent
Statement to the
Israeli Public, 10
November 2000.

See Document 128.
"The Clinton
Parameters," 23
December 2000.

See Document 129.
PLO Negotiating
Team, Reservations
Concerning US
President Clinton's
23 December
Proposals for an
Israeli-Palestinian
Peace Agreement,
Ramallah and Gaza,
1 January 2001.

See Document 130.
Draft of the Pales-
tinian Constitution,
14 February 2001.

launched in December was received coldly by the Israelis and met with only marginal support in Palestinian society. The "Model Israeli-Palestinian Peace Agreement" was launched by Yossi Beilin, a former Labor/Meretz Israeli cabinet member, and Yasser Abed Rabbo, a member of the PLO Executive Committee, two long-time architects of Middle East peace initiatives. They proposed details for a new permanent status agreement based upon UN Resolutions 242 and 338, but as Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon did not support the initiative, no further progress was made.

The PLC continued to move forward with an all-new cabinet and a new speaker. More importantly, Prime Minister Sharon came to the Knesset with his revised Unilateral Disengagement Plan in January 2004 and was able to win support. Though many people on both sides were skeptical of the plan and its motives, it was approved by the Israelis and ostensibly gave the PNA an opening to begin discussing Gaza security arrangements with Egypt. US President George W. Bush endorsed the plan, though by May 2004 he was calling the establishment of a Palestinian state "not likely."

In July 2004, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) issued an advisory opinion on the Israeli construction of a wall between Israeli territory and territories in the West Bank. It ruled that the construction of a wall was contrary to international law and said that Israel should cease further construction of a wall, dismantle what had already been built, and make reparations for all damage caused by the building of the wall. Israel rejected the ICJ ruling. A subsequent declaration by the UN General Assembly demanded that Israel comply with the ICJ ruling.

Palestinians continued to see their situation regress in the latter half of 2004. Marwan Barghout, a popular Fateh leader who rose to prominence during the Intifadas, was convicted and given five consecutive life sentences by an Israeli court in June. He had put up no defense.

Sharon's view that Israel "has come to the conclusion that there is currently no reliable Palestinian partner with which it can make progress in a bilateral peace process" led him to propose a unilateral withdrawal from Gaza, on the grounds that it would provide Israel better security than continued struggles of occupation there. He explained his rationale for the idea to the Knesset in October 2004, and the policy was approved in January 2005.

See Document 131. Jordanian-Egyptian Proposal for Cessation of Palestinian-Israeli Violence and Resumption of Negotiations, 17 April 2001.

See Document 132. Sharm El-Sheikh Fact-Finding Committee Final Report ("Mitchell Report"), 30 April 2001.

See Document 133. Palestine Liberation Organization, Official Response to the Final Report of the Sharm El-Sheikh Fact-Finding Committee ("Mitchell Report"), 15 May 2001.

See Document 134. US Ambassador to Israel Martin Indyk, Speech on the Lessons Learned from the Peace Process, Tel Aviv, 12 July 2001.

See Document 135. Palestinian National Authority, Basic Law, 29 May 2002.

See Document 136. The Ayalon-Nusseibeh Statement of Principles ("The People's Voice"), 27 July 2002.

PALESTINIAN POLITICS POST-ARAFAT

The loss of President Yasser Arafat in November 2004 was a severe blow to Palestinians. Though his death was not a surprise given his deteriorating health, it was still a shock to the people whose struggle he had embodied for almost three decades. Mahmoud Abbas stepped in to head the PLO as international observers attempted to frame the situation as a chance to finally make peace between the Israelis and the mourning Palestinians. At the same time, Hamas made its first appearance in municipal elections and showed the first signs of the movement's rising popularity among the Palestinian electorate.

In hindsight, the most important storyline from the first half of 2005 was the increasing tension between Fateh and Hamas. The major round of municipal elections that was held in May solidified Hamas' place as the main foil to Fateh. The superior strategy and organization of Hamas contributed to the success of its first foray into electoral politics, while Fateh's own disorganization doomed it to a weak performance. Even with the looming disengagement and the Israeli push to complete the separation barrier around East Jerusalem, Hamas' chances in the upcoming PLC elections remained at the forefront of the Palestinian political discussion. To buy himself and his party more time, President Abbas announced a decision to postpone those elections until January 2006.

ANOTHER PHASE OF TRANSITION IN THE PALESTINIAN-ISRAELI CONFLICT

In August 2005, Israel's unilateral decision to remove 8,500 settlers living in the occupied Gaza Strip was ready for implementation. Sharon's plan had been met with skepticism from both sides of the conflict and had endured numerous protests and violence from right-wing Israelis. Still, the plan went forward and was completed in mid-September. The positive feelings in the Gaza Strip after the evacuation of all the Israeli settlers were short-lived, however, as it became clear that "disengagement" was not an accurate term for the plan. In fact, with none of their own citizens left in the Gaza Strip, Israeli politicians were now free to use the Israeli army to suffocate the entire Strip.

The second half of 2005 saw continued progress on Palestinian-Israeli normalization, with agreements on movement

See Document 137.
A Performance-
Based Road Map
to a Permanent
Two-State Solution
to the Israeli-
Palestinian Conflict,
30 April 2003.

See Document 138.
Israeli Cabinet,
Communiqué
Approving Removal
of Chairman Arafat,
Jerusalem, 11 Sep-
tember 2003.

See Document 139.
Draft Permanent
Status Agreement –
“The Geneva
Accords”, Jordan,
12 October 2003.

See Document 140.
Fateh Movement,
Statement on the
Geneva Accords, 1
Dec 2003.

See Document 141.
PLO Executive
Committee,
Political Statement
after Meeting with
Representatives
of The Palestinian
Factions, Ramallah,
30 May 2004.

See Document 142.
International Court
of Justice, Legal
Consequences of
the Construction of
a Wall in the Occu-
pied Palestinian
Territory, Summary
and Actual Ruling, 9
July 2004.

between the West Bank and Gaza Strips, crossing at the Rafah border point, and economic growth being reached. While not major accomplishments, these were significant in the fact that they happened at all, and they were part of a series of agreements that might be leading to something bigger.

By the start of 2006, the Palestinian legislative elections that had been postponed for over six months were finally held. Palestinians went to the polls and brought to life a dilemma beloved of political scientists: what happens when the winner of a democratic election is not fully a participant in the democratic process? Specifically, Palestinians elected an overwhelming majority government of Hamas members for their democratically chosen legislature. Hamas furthered the electoral success they had enjoyed in the municipal elections of the year before, and the Palestinian political scene was on the verge of a major shift. Long listed as a terrorist organization by the US Department of State, the election of Hamas represented a move away from the peace process. In response to Hamas' victory, aid coming from the US, Israel, the European Union, and many other nations was cut off. By May, Ehud Olmert had assumed the post of Prime Minister and chosen to cease talking to the PNA. The relations, or lack thereof, were further complicated in June with the capture of Israeli soldier Gilad Shalit by a Palestinian group in Gaza.

PALESTINIAN IN-FIGHTING AND RENEWED INTERNATIONAL EFFORTS

Intra-Palestinian fighting intensified in January 2007, as Hamas and Fateh failed to reach an agreement that would establish a unity government. The two sides met in Saudi Arabia in February, with Hamas leader Khaled Masha'al and President Abbas meeting to reconcile the differences between the two parties. The Mecca Agreement that came out of that meeting was not respected, and would be soon forgotten. The factional fighting reached a head in June as Hamas gained military control of Gaza in what they claimed was a preemptive maneuver to counter American and Israeli influence in the Palestinian political rift. Violence among all three sides – Israel, Hamas, and Fateh – claimed the lives of many Palestinians during the summer of 2007. Hamas solidified its hold on Gaza and scored a political coup by securing the release of BBC reporter Alan Johnston, who had been kidnapped by militants in Gaza four months earlier.

See Document 143. Palestinian Public Figures, Public Statement on a National Salvation Government, 14 August 2004.

See Document 144. Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon, Speech to the Knesset, Jerusalem, 26 October 2004.

See Document 145. The Disengagement Plan – General Outline, 25 January 2005.

See Document 146. Islamic Jihad Movement in Palestine, Statement to the Palestinian People, 22 June 2005.

See Document 147. Israeli Cabinet, Communiqué on the Beginning of the Implementation of the Disengagement Plan, Jerusalem, 15 August 2005.

See Document 148. Report of the Special Rapporteur of the UN Commission on Human Rights on the Situation of Human Rights in the Palestinian Territories Occupied by Israel since 1967 (UNGA A/60/271), 18 August 2005.

The latter half of 2007 was marked by renewed efforts from the international community to find a lasting peace for Palestinians. The Quartet on the Middle East appointed Tony Blair as its envoy on the same day that he stepped down as Britain's Prime Minister. The US restored some aid to the Palestinians in order to bolster the standing of President Abbas. In July, a call by President Bush (as his eight years as President were drawing to a close) for an international meeting to be held in the fall was endorsed by the UN and the Quartet. Formal invitations were sent out in late November, with US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice acting as the chief organizer. President Abbas described the meeting as an opportunity for a "new beginning," though his optimism was countered by skepticism among large sections of the Israeli, Palestinian, and international communities.

The conference was held at the end of November at the US Naval Academy of Annapolis, marking the first time both sides came to negotiations agreeing upon a two-state solution, and was also noteworthy for the inclusion of many Arab nations that had not actively participated in the peace process before. The stated goal was to set up a timetable for future negotiations on final status issues along the guidelines of the 2002 "Road Map for Peace."

President Abbas, Prime Minister Olmert, and representatives from more than 30 nations, the UN Security Council, and the Quartet were in attendance, and the meeting resulted in a draft resolution presented to the Security Council by the US, though it was quickly withdrawn due to Israeli objections. The final "Joint Understanding" that was issued left the door open for future progress, although in the immediate aftermath, the question of whether Annapolis would bring about meaningful negotiations remained open, and Palestinians were left wondering whether their future would hold revived prospects for peace or another period of transition into further conflict.

OLMERT TO NETANYAHU, AGAIN

Ehud Olmert, who became acting prime minister in January 2006 after Ariel Sharon had suffered a severe stroke, engaged in 36 negotiating sessions with PNA President Mahmoud Abbas between 2006 and the end of September 2008. Olmert presented a plan for peace to President Abbas at the end of August 2008, which reportedly went

See Document 149.
President
Mahmoud Abbas,
Decree on the Leg-
islative Elections,
Gaza, 20 August
2005.

See Document 150.
Israeli-Palestinian
Agreement on
Movement and
Access, 15
November 2005.

See Document 151.
Agreed Principles
for the Rafah
Crossing, 15
November 2005.

See Document 152.
Joint Israeli-
Palestinian Private
Sector Declara-
tion, Conference
on Promoting
Economic Growth
in West Bank and
Gaza, London, 13
December 2005.

See Document 153.
President
Mahmoud Abbas,
Speech after the
Announcement
of the Results of
the 2nd Palestinian
Legislative Council
Elections, Ramallah,
26 January 2006.

See Document 154.
Israeli Prime
Minister's Bureau,
Statement on
the Palestinian
Legislative Council,
Jerusalem, 26 Janu-
ary 2006.

beyond anything that had been offered by Israel to the Palestinians prior to that time – including ceding almost 94 percent of the West Bank for the establishment of a Palestinian state and agreeing to a land swap for the 6.4 percent of the West Bank that Israel would keep, a promise to evacuate many (but not all) Israeli settlements, maintain the contiguity of the Palestinian state and create a safe passage between the West Bank and Gaza, and many other important points. At the meeting he showed Abbas a map which he labeled “a final offer,” but Abbas rejected the deal because he felt that he needed to study Olmert’s terms, as well as have Palestinian experts study the map that Olmert had proposed, which Olmert had refused to let him take from the meeting.

Olmert announced his intention to resign as prime minister in July 2008, and he resigned in September when the new Kadima party leader, Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni, was tasked with forming a government by Israel’s President Shimon Peres. She proved unable to form a majority coalition in the Knesset, and President Peres gave Likud’s leader Benjamin Netanyahu a mandate for forming a government. Netanyahu was able to form a government and again became Israel’s prime minister. Where Olmert had been interested in supporting negotiations and moving in a two-state direction, Netanyahu was not, and the peace process as previously understood slowed down considerably.

In 2009, the UN Human Rights Council authorized a fact-finding mission on the Gaza conflict that took place between 27 December 2008, and 18 January 2009, specifically focused on whether international law was respected by both the Israeli and the Hamas sides, and whether “disproportionate attacks in violation of customary international law” had been launched by Israel. Israel refused to cooperate with the inquiry and anticipated a very critical report to be issued; it was not disappointed. The report – known as the “Goldstone Report,” named after its chair Justice Richard Goldstone of South Africa – was highly critical of Israel and suggested that “crimes against humanity” may, indeed, have taken place.

Gaza continued to be a flash point in the tensions in the region, and in 2012 again open military action developed. Israel’s “Operation Pillar of Defense” was focused on Hamas rockets that were being launched against civilian targets in Israel, and also on tunnels that were being dug by Hamas.

See Document 155.
Program of the
 Hamas Government,
 11 March 2006.

See Document 156.
Israeli Prime Min-
ister Ehud Olmert,
Address to the
Knesset, Jerusalem,
4 May 2006.

See Document 157.
National Concil-
iation Document
of the Palestinian
Prisoners (Original
Version), 11 May
2006.

See Document 158.
Government of
Israel, Reaction to
the Palestinian 'Pris-
oners' Document'
(“A Text Analysis”),
29 June 2006.

See Document 159.
Palestinian NGO
Network (PNGO),
Statement Con-
demning Israel's War
Crimes in Gaza and
Lebanon, Ramallah,
17 July 2006.

See Document 160.
PLO Executive
Committee,
Decisions during
the Meeting to
Study Alternative
Options, Ramallah,
10 December 2006.

See Document 161.
Mecca Accord
between Hamas
and Fateh, Mecca, 8
February 2007.

Two years later the conflict flared up again, and “Operation Protective Edge” was launched by Israel against Gaza. Because of the 2009 Goldstone Report and the international condemnation that it generated for Israel’s “disproportionate” response at the time, Israel was extremely sensitive about documenting its actions in the 2014 fighting, documenting what provoked the escalation in violence, documenting its limited objectives, and documenting that its military action was, indeed, “proportional.” At the conclusion of the fighting, the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs released a report on “Factual and Legal Aspects” of the 2014 Gaza conflict.

In its annual report in June 2016, the Middle East Quartet – the group that first appeared with the Roadmap in 2003 (US, Russia, Europe, and the UN) – observed that current trends were threatening the viability of a “two-state solution” in the Palestine-Israeli conflict. Major threats continued to include security for Israel, on one side, and Israeli settlements in the West Bank, on the other side. The Quartet indicated that it would continue to work toward a solution based upon UN Security Council resolutions 242 (1967) and 338 (1973).

THE TRUMP ERA AND BEYOND

In 2016 Donald Trump was elected President of the United States, and he brought with him a unique perspective of the Middle East, and indeed the world, as well as a unique style of operation. He had campaigned as a strong ally of Israel; the Palestinian people and desires for Palestinian sovereignty were not high priorities for him.

As the year 2017 came to an end, the question of progress toward peace in the Middle East was again on discussion agendas of world leaders when Trump did what no American president had done in the history of the State of Israel: declared American recognition of Jerusalem as Israel’s capital, and announced that the US would begin the process of moving its embassy to Jerusalem from Tel Aviv. (The US Congress had passed such resolutions in the past, but previous presidents had not applied them because of feelings that such action would hurt the peace process.) Trump had been widely counseled to *not* follow through with his campaign promise to recognize Jerusalem as Israel’s capital and to move the US Embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem, but despite widespread criticism he went ahead with his plan.

See Document 162. Prime Minister-Elect Ismail Haniyeh, Speech before the Palestinian Legislative Council (Program of Palestinian Unity Government), Gaza, 17 March 2007.

See Document 163. Palestinian Authority, Program of the National Unity Government, 17 March 2007.

See Document 164. Statement by the Middle East Quartet, 21 March 2007.

See Document 165. President Mahmoud Abbas, Speech at the Annapolis Conference, Annapolis, Maryland, 27 November 2007.

See Document 166. Israeli-Palestinian Agreement to Formally Restart Mideast Peace Talks, US Naval Academy, Annapolis, Maryland, 27 November 2007.

See Document 167. Confidential Summary of Israeli Prime Minister Olmert's "Package" Offer to Palestine President Abu Mazen, 31 August 2008.

The decision sparked immediate protests in Jerusalem and throughout the Middle East.

Leaders from the Middle East and Europe criticized the announcement and said that the decision showed a lack of knowledge about security issues and would be harmful to the peace process. That did not sway Trump's decision, and in his statement, he repeated his view that he was simply recognizing the obvious and that this was a step that would advance the peace process and work toward a lasting agreement in the region.

Trump's team continued to press for progress on a Middle East peace plan, and on January 28, 2020, it released "Peace to Prosperity, A Vision to Improve the Lives of the Palestinian and Israeli People." The plan, which was focused on business, outside investment, and economic development, also included support for Israeli settlement expansion and proposed creating a Palestinian state that many felt was not a viable state but rather a collection of disconnected Palestinian enclaves surrounded by Israel. The plan was accepted by Israel, but was rejected by the Palestinians and the Arab League.

Later that year, Trump's final year in the White House, a breakthrough came when the United States, Israel, and the United Arab Emirates announced in August that Israel and the UAE had "agreed to the full normalization of relations," and that a deal to be known as "The Abraham Accords" would be presented a month later. Israel and the UAE soon signed bilateral agreements relating to investment, tourism, direct flights, security, telecommunications, and other issues, and agreed to open embassies and exchange ambassadors. The Palestinians denounced the agreement, but the Arab League did not; the Arab League even denied the PNA's request to hold an emergency meeting to discuss the new Accords.

The ICJ continued to be a focus of attention for Palestinian supporters, and as they had done with previous challenges to Israeli occupation policy in 2023, they took the issue of Israeli occupation policies in Palestinian territory to the Court, seeking an authoritative ruling and a way to weaken the effects of Israeli occupation upon the Palestinian people. In July 2024, the ICJ handed down a decision that was unambiguously critical of Israeli policy and that directed Israel and its supporters to stop the offending practices. The problem with ICJ opinions, of course, is that there

See Document 168. United Nations: Human Rights in Palestine and Other Occupied Arab Territories (“The Goldstone Report”), 25 September 2009.

See Document 169. Government of Israel: The 2014 Gaza Conflict: Factual and Legal Aspects: Executive Summary, May 2015.

See Document 170. Report of the Middle East Quartet, 1 July 2016.

See Document 171. Trump Administration Recognition of Jerusalem as the Capital of Israel, 6 December 2017.

See Document 172. “Peace to Prosperity” (“Trump Peace Plan”) Overview, January 2020.

See Document 173. “The Abraham Accords Declaration,” 15 September 2020.

See Document 174. International Court of Justice, “Legal Consequences Arising from the Policies and Practices of Israel in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Including East Jerusalem,” 19 July 2024.

is no direct mechanism for their enforcement, and such was the case here. Israel ignored the opinion, and so did its supporters such as the United States.

THE 2023 HAMAS INVASION OF ISRAEL

With the perspective offered by the passage of time, we can observe that the October 7, 2023 Hamas invasion of Israel – resulting in over 1,300 Israeli (overwhelmingly civilian) deaths – may well have been the greatest strategic blunder in the modern quest for national sovereignty for Palestine. While some have offered justification for the Hamas invasion of Israel, including it being a response to Israeli occupation, Israel’s blockade of the Gaza Strip, Israeli settler violence against Palestinians, restrictions on the movements of Palestinians, the imprisonment of thousands of Palestinians, frustration with the articulated goals of Israel’s right-wing government, or something else, the October 7 invasion of Israel resulted in the deaths of the largest number of Israelis since its independence. The invasion brought about a massive and prolonged response from Israel.

In the war that followed the invasion, between October of 2023 and January of 2025, Israel said it was trying to destroy the military and governing capabilities of Hamas, but the impact of its military response fell substantially on civilians. More than 46,000 Palestinians – primarily civilians – were killed in that conflict, according to the Hamas-run health ministry. Prior to the invasion, Gaza – an area 41 kilometers (25 miles) long and 10 kilometers (7 miles) wide – with a population density of about 14,000 people per square mile, had a modern infrastructure, with streets, schools, stores, hospitals, and a full range of modern conveniences. Following the invasion, the bulk of Gaza was uninhabitable. The United Nations estimated the damaged buildings to include more than 90% of all housing units in Gaza, and more than 1.9 million of Gaza’s 2.2 million people were forced to leave their homes. About 1.8 million people experienced high levels of “acute food insecurity.”¹ It was unclear how much of the estimated network of more than 500 kilometers (310 miles) of tunnels built by Hamas in support of its military activity remained.²

On January 19, 2025, a three-stage ceasefire between Israel and Hamas came into effect, drafted and mediated by the United States, Egypt, and Qatar.

One unfortunate consequence of the invasion, and the war that followed, was a significant decline in support for a two-state solution to the conflict. In 2012, 61% of the Israeli population supported the existence of an independent Palestinian state. At the end of 2023, 25% of the Israeli population supported a two-state solution. Public opinion in the Palestinian Territories was very similar, with 59% supporting a two-state solution in 2012 and 24% at the end of 2023.³ In 2024, in response to the question “Do you think that a permanent peace between Israel and Palestine will ever be achieved?”, 66% of Israelis and 68% of Palestinians from the West Bank and East Jerusalem responded “no.”⁴

And the future of Gaza itself was certainly in doubt. On February 4, 2025, US President Donald Trump announced that Gaza was “uninhabitable,” suggested that displaced Palestinians in Gaza should be permanently resettled in neighboring Arab states, and proposed that the US would “take ownership” of Gaza and redevelop it into “the Riviera of the Middle East.”⁵ While his comments promptly received substantial and intense criticism, from Arab and other international leaders and American political actors alike, Trump continued to press his proposal, and even threatened Jordan and Egypt with the loss of American foreign aid if they did not take the Gazan population into their nations.⁶

While Gaza is only a part of Palestine, the 2023–2025 military action that took place in Gaza clearly affected any progress that had previously been made toward the creation of an independent Palestinian state. Israel’s Prime Minister Netanyahu was not a strong supporter of Palestinian sovereignty prior to the Hamas invasion, and he vigorously returned to his anti-Palestinian positions after the invasion. Whatever benefit the invasion may have had for Hamas’ short-term standing in Gaza, it resulted in many, many Palestinian deaths, destruction of much Palestinian property, and was a substantial setback for a sovereign Palestinian state.

THE STUDY OF PALESTINIAN POLITICAL HISTORY

We have covered over 150 years of history in the preceding pages. This coverage has clearly not included a number of key historical events, important documents, and significant actors, but as we indicated in the Preface it was inevitable that such a thing would happen. The goal of this introduction, and the collection of over 170 documents that follow, is to provide a resource for students, to permit them to examine carefully *some* of the key documents that have been significant in the process of the Palestinian people’s quest for sovereignty, national identity, and political independence, in the hope that this will eventually lead to the establishment of a Palestinian state.

Notes

- 1 BBC News, “Gaza Strip in Maps: How 15 Months of War Have Drastically Changed Life in the Territory,” BBC News, 16 January 2025, found online at <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-20415675>. See also *AlJazeera*,

- “Gaza Transformed into Rubble-Strewn Wasteland after Israeli Bombardment,” (February 5, 2025), found online at <https://www.aljazeera.com/gallery/2025/2/5/gaza-transformed-into-rubble-strewn-wasteland-after-israeli-bombardment>.
- 2 Reuters, “Inside the Tunnels of Gaza,” (December 31, 2023), found online at <https://www.reuters.com/graphics/ISRAEL-PALESTINIANS/GAZA-TUNNELS/gkvldmzorvb/>.
- 3 Benedict Vigers, “Life in Israel After Oct. 7 in 5 Charts,” *World* (December 22, 2023), available online at <https://news.gallup.com/poll/547760/life-israel-oct-charts.aspx>.
- 4 Benedict Vigers, “Dim Outlook for Peace in the Middle East,” *World* (October 1, 2024), available online at <https://news.gallup.com/poll/650636/dim-outlook-peace-middle-east.aspx>.
- 5 Reuters, “What to Know About Trump’s Proposal to Take Over Gaza,” (February 6, 2025), found online at <https://www.reuters.com/world/us/what-know-about-trumps-gaza-strip-proposal-2025-02-05/>.
- 6 Zolan Kanno-Youngs and Shawn McCreesh, “Using the Threat of Cutting Aid, Trump Presses Jordan and Egypt to Take in Gazans,” *The New York Times* (February 10, 2025), found online at <https://www.nytimes.com/live/2025/02/11/us/president-trump-news#trump-jordan-egypt-gaza-development>.

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